NAIROBI— The joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, has rapidly escalated into a regional conflict now entering its second week. Codenamed Operation Roaring Lion (Israel) and Operation Epic Fury (US), the strikes have targeted Iranian leadership—including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—nuclear facilities, ballistic missile sites, and command structures, with the explicit aim of regime change and degrading Tehran’s military capabilities.

Iran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, Lebanon (via Hezbollah) and US bases, while partially disrupting the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint for 20% of global oil.

Although direct combat remains confined to the Middle East, the war is already transmitting significant spillover effects to Africa. These are most acute in the Horn of Africa due to its proximity to the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and in Somalia via proxy networks. Impacts are still in early stages (as of March 6, 2026), but projections point to heightened economic pressures and security risks that could exacerbate existing vulnerabilities.

Economic Impacts: Energy Shocks, Shipping Disruptions and Inflation Across Africa

Africa, a net oil importer with limited refining capacity, is structurally exposed to Middle East energy volatility. Brent crude surged from around $70 to over $80 per barrel in the first days of the conflict, with potential spikes to $100 if Hormuz disruptions worsen.This has immediate knock-on effects:

* Fuel and transport costs: Nigeria reported an 11% rise in pump prices within days. Across the continent, higher diesel and petrol prices are inflating food transport and electricity generation costs (many countries rely on imported fuel for power).

* Shipping and trade rerouting: Iranian retaliation and Houthi threats have slowed traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and raised risks in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb. Major carriers are already diverting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10–14 days and thousands of dollars per container. This hikes import costs for fuel, food, and manufactured goods while reducing Suez Canal revenues (critical for Egypt).

* Food security and inflation: Higher fuel and fertilizer prices threaten already fragile African food systems. The African Union has warned of repercussions for price stability and food security continent-wide.

— Horn of Africa– specific effects are sharper because of dependence on Red Sea ports. Djibouti handles over 90% of Ethiopia’s trade; any slowdown or insurance premium spikes directly raises costs for landlocked Ethiopia. Berbera port in Somaliland (upgraded by UAE) faces heightened risk as a potential Houthi target.

Broader African economies already strained by debt see added pressure: remittances from Gulf workers (e.g., over 400,000 Kenyans) could decline if regional instability persists, while Iran-Africa trade (which surged 85% in Iranian exports in 2025) faces disruption.

Longer-term, prolonged war could trigger global inflation (estimated +0.8%) and recession risks, hitting commodity-dependent African exporters and highly indebted nations hardest.

Security Impacts: Proxy Risks, Base Vulnerabilities and Regional Spillover

Security effects stem from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” network, particularly the Houthis in Yemen and their growing links to African actors. The Horn’s strategic realignments—US, Israeli, Emirati, and Chinese bases—make it a potential theater for retaliation.

Continent-wide: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah have plotted attacks or sought influence in countries including Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Sahel. The war could accelerate Iranian outreach to anti-Western regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (already receiving Iranian drones and discussing uranium).

Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE) may temporarily reduce proxy funding in African conflicts to focus on Iran, potentially de-escalating Sudan’s civil war or Ethiopian tensions short-term—but this could also create power vacuums.

Horn of Africa: The region sits at the nexus of Red Sea competition.

Key risks include:

* Foreign military bases: The US base at Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti, ~4,000–5,000 personnel) is within Houthi missile range; Djibouti’s pro-Palestinian neutrality has so far spared it direct Iranian strikes, but escalation remains possible.

* Somaliland/Berbera: Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland and reported Israeli security presence (plus UAE upgrades) have drawn explicit Houthi threats. Berbera port and airstrip—less than 200 miles from Bab el-Mandeb—could become targets, risking direct spillover into Somaliland-Somalia tensions.

* Gulf rivalries: UAE-Saudi competition (e.g., UAE backing in Sudan’s RSF and Ethiopia; Saudi mediation efforts) may pause or realign as both prioritize Iran, affecting arms flows and stability in Sudan and northern Ethiopia.

Somalia-specific dynamics: Al-Shabaab has deepened ties with the Houthis since 2024, including weapons smuggling, drone/IED training, and logistics. UN reports highlight cooperation that could enable increased piracy in the Gulf of Aden or attacks on shipping.

Any Israeli or US military footprint in Somaliland risks drawing Somalia’s federal government into confrontation while strengthening al-Shabaab’s narrative and capabilities. Djibouti’s neutrality and Somalia’s calls to reject Somaliland recognition add diplomatic friction. Overall, the war could complicate counter-terrorism efforts (including US and AU missions) and heighten maritime insecurity off Somalia’s coast.

Outlook: Short-Term Pain, Uncertain Long-Term Trajectory

In the short term (weeks to months), the dominant effects are economic—rising energy and shipping costs amplifying inflation and straining budgets—coupled with “elevated security risks” around Red Sea assets and proxy networks. The Horn faces the greatest exposure due to geography and foreign basing.

Longer-term outcomes hinge on the war’s duration and resolution. A quick de-escalation might limit damage; a prolonged conflict could entrench Houthi-al-Shabaab collaboration, force Gulf states into new African realignments and trigger sustained oil volatility that slows Africa’s post-pandemic recovery. Djibouti’s neutrality and Somalia’s sovereignty concerns will be tested, while broader African states (especially in the Sahel) may see fluctuating Iranian engagement.

The African Union and Horn governments have called for restraint, underscoring the continent’s limited agency but high vulnerability. As the conflict evolves rapidly, monitoring Houthi actions, oil markets and Red Sea shipping will be critical for anticipating further spillover. The 2026 US-Israel-Iran War is not only reshaping the Middle East—it is already testing Africa’s economic resilience and security architecture in profound ways.